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The Law School Compensation Systems at
Three Top Quartile State Law Schools:
Factors Correlating With Law Professors'
Salaries and Suggestions
BRUCE D. FISHER* AND PAUL BOWEN**

INTRODUCTION

Mr. George Hoyle was the dean at Mega State Law School. His morning
agenda was busy with two faculty appointments; first with Mary Jones, a
young associate professor, and later, another with Bill Smith, a veteran full
professor.
HOYLE: Mary, please come in and be seated.
JONES: Dean Hoyle, I appreciateyour taking the time to meet with me.
HOYLE: Mary, I believe it is the obligationof an administratorto meet
with faculty periodicallyto discuss their concerns. How can I help you?
JONES: Well, Dean Hoyle, I am concerned that my salary does not
reflect my legal researchproductivity. I have been on the staff here at Mega
for ten years and have produced law review articles regularly, but after
examining the college's budget, my salary appears to be based on factors
other than scholarship.
HOYLE: Mary, I am delighted that you feel so comfortable about
discussing such a sensitive topic with me. Many of your colleagueswould fret
or grouse privately about it. You, however, came directly to me andfor that
I am grateful. Now, about the matters you raise. The law school is concerned
with developing ideas. It follows the merit principle: The more scholarship
one does, the greateris one's salary. I believe salaryand law review hit rate
among professors here would support me on this.

* @Bruce D. Fisher and Paul Bowen 1999. Professor of Business Law, College of
Business Administration, University of Tennessee - Knoxville. B.B.A., University of Michigan,
1965; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1968; LL.M., George Washington University
Law School, 1974.
** Senior Lecturer, Department of Commerce, University of Queensland. B.Sc.,
Georgia Institute of Technology, 1973; M.B.A., University of Tennessee, 1976; M.Acc.,
University of Tennessee, 1990; Ph.D., University of Tennessee, 1992; M.S. in Computer
Science, University of Tennessee, 1995.
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JONES: But Dean Hoyle, I have looked at the LegalTrac computerized
data base for law publications. In ourfaculty, the younger members are
producing more scholarship than seniorfaculty.
HOYLE: That reflects a careerpattern phenomenon, Mary. Younger
faculty have the pressureof making tenure which forces them to produce at
what,frankly, are unsustainableratesfor an entire career. Owing to the law
school's desire to create a positive working environmentfor youngerfaculty,
we assign them fewer administrativeduties - such as committee service during their probationaryyears than olderfaculty. Once faculty members
make tenure and assume other duties within the school, they will find that
their rate of scholarlyproductivity does decline, but it still exists.
JONES: But in looking at salaries,it appearsthat scholarshipbears very
little relationshipto salary,whereas 'justbeing here' or seniority appears to
dominate salary determination.
HOYLE: I readily admit that seniorityplays a part - but only a part- in
salary determinations. Scholarship is a very importantpart.
JONES: I do admireyour efforts to increase the number of women law
faculty, Dean Hoyle.
HOYLE: Mary, when I came into this job, there was only one woman
faculty member. Today there are seven. Also there are now minorityfaculty,
whereas there was none when I came into this office. I might add, Mary, that
politically the addition of women faculty members is not universally popular
with this school's various constituencies. Some believe that women are taking
'slots' on the faculty which could have gone to more qualified men. There is
also afear that gender is becoming a proxy for scholarly accomplishments in
promotion, tenure, and salary matters. The faculty and I have tried to
anticipate such concerns by appointing women who possess academic
credentialswhich are as good, if not better, than those of the white men and
by promoting only those with strong records of scholarshipand teaching.
JONES: All faculty do appreciateyour efforts to diversify the faculty.
But could I make one suggestion that might make the salarysystem fairer?
HOYLE: Of course.
JONES: As you have just said, women are newer to the law faculty than
men. You also have said that seniorityplays a significantpart in determining
lawfaculty salaries...
HOYLE: (interrupting) I only meant 'apart'not a 'significantpart.'
JONES: Then women are being discriminatedagainstbecause they are
women.
HOYLE: Mary, you are saying that the salary regime of this law school
discriminatesagainstwomen. I vehemently deny that! If a man has the same

1999]

1LA
W PROFESSORS' SALARIES

amount of seniority as a woman, he would have the same salary as the woman
assuming their scholarshipwas approximatelyequivalent.
JONES: Dean Hoyle, you are the last person I would accuse of overt sex
discrimination. But you are administering a system which because of its
overweighting of seniority does, in fact, discriminateagainst women.
HOYLE: I would agree with you, Mary, except for the last word
'women.' The salarysystem this law school administersdoes use seniority as
afactor in the determination of salaries. As such, seniority does distinguish
salariesamong faculty, but if a man and a woman have the same seniority,
they will have approximately the same salary adjusted, of course, for
scholarly productivity. Thus, the salary system is gender neutral - it
discriminatesnot on gender, but on seniority. The Civil Rights Act and the
Fair Labor Standards Act both recognize goodfaith seniority systems as a
defense to charges under those acts.
JONES: But if women are recent hires, doesn't this mean that they will
be proportionatelymore disadvantagedthan men?
HOYLE: But women have been hired in greater proportion to recent
hires than have men. Then to say that they are being discriminatedagainst
when they are admittedly less experienced - anotherword for 'seniority' - is
perverse. The law school is being challengedfor its good deeds - introducing
greatergender diversity.
JONES: No, sir,what I am saying is that a new, improved salary system
which places greateremphasis on scholarlyproductivity and less on seniority
than does the current system would benefit productive men and women. I
would bet that there are productive male scholars who feel that their
scholarshippost-tenure is ignored and who would appreciate a system that
continued to reward them right up to retirement.
HOYLE: Mary, we've had quite an exchange here today. Let's both
think about what we have said here today and get back together another time
to discuss this some more. (Mary exits and Prof. Bill Smith enters.) Bill, come
in and sit down.
SMITH: George,I have to get this off my chest. I have been producing
law review article after law review article over the years. I checked the
college's budget a while back, and I am receiving no recognitionfor my
scholarly efforts.
HOYLE: Oh come now, Bill, we all recognize and appreciate your
ongoing commitment to legal scholarship. You were recognized with a
professorshipa while back.
SMITH: Well the salariescertainly don't reflect it! John Duffy, who has
the office across the hall, hasn't written an article in a decade and a half and
he makes as much as I do. He was given a professorship,too.
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HOYLE: Well, Bill, I'm gladyou mentioned John. He has had some very
sensitive and demanding committee assignments in recentyears. I would be
surprisedif he had been able to produce any scholarship.
SMITH: Come on, George, you know that writing law review articlesis
the 'heavy lifting' of academe and that it translates into our school's
academic reputation. We do self-study after self-study when the state
legislaturecomplains about our school's ranking,and it all boils down to the
fact that not enough of our seniorfaculty contribute to the ideas of our
profession outside of class. I admit that there are some great lecturers here,
but they should be able to sit down before a computer and write up a law
review piece occasionally.
HOYLE: Bill, I didn't want to bringthis up, but since you persist,I shall.
Both you and John Duffy are graduatesof the same top 10 law school, but
John was on the law review andyou weren't. Ergo, he has strongeracademic
credentialsthan you which explains why his salary is as high as yours even
though you have published much more than he has.
SMITH: George, what we did as students a generation ago is long
forgotten. I have grown and developed since my student days. I have engaged
in scholarship which has been vetted by outside law journals. If John is so
smart, why doesn't this show up in his scholarship?
HOYLE: But his law review credential is a measure of excellence that
you don't have and it has a market value. Presumablyhe knows more law
than you or at least can develop a legal argument that is more sophisticated
than you.
SMITH: If he can develop legal arguments that I can't, why isn't he
doing it now in law journals?
HOYLE: Bill, you make a good point. I want you to bring this up at the
next faculty meeting.
SMITH: George, if I do what you suggest I'll alienate myselffrom my
peers more than I already have by out-producingthem. You're the boss. You
should raise this point.
HOYLE: Bill, you are more of a scholar than I am. I have been an
administratorfor years and haven't had the time to do any scholarly writing.
No, since you are the one with the scholarly accomplishments, you should
raisethe point at the faculty meeting. You have the scholarly credibility.
SMITH: George,face it. You don't respect me or scholarshipat all.
HOYLE: You're wrong there, Bill. I do respect you, but the reality is
that our state's leaders and citizenry make high sounding statements about
wanting us to become a 'top' law school, but they refuse to fund us
commensurately with their aspiration level. Bill, the truth is, you are
overproducinggiven the state's economic supportfor us, while the rest of the
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faculty has resigneditself to the resource reality at Mega and has adjusted its
scholarly productivity accordingly.
This is a study of law school faculty salaries at three state law schools
in the United States. We performed regression analysis and other statistical
tests on the data to analyze the association of salary with factors such as
seniority, scholarly productivity, and gender.

Initially, one confronts the question, "Why engage in such an
undertaking?" There are many answers. Studying law school faculties is
important given the fact that they train future attorneys, judges, business and
government leaders. Because law faculties are instrumental in shaping careers
of many' of the U.S.'s most powerful individuals,2 law professors are very
important people in contemporary U.S. society and thus are worthy of study.

What do we pay them? What qualities do law faculty have, and how do these

qualities affect their compensation?
Law faculties are also the incubators of ideas affecting law and society.
Learned articles3 and books4 have been written by law faculty suggesting legal

remedies for all sorts of perceived social wrongs. Another reason for

examining law school salary structures is to determine how inclusive law
schools are. Today, university administrators are expected to build faculties
inclusive of different demographic and cultural groups within society 5 and are,
1. The lawyer population in the United States is projected to reach 1,005,842 by the
year 2000. See BARBARA A. CURRAN AND CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT: THE LEGAL PROFESSION INTHE 1990s 1 (1994). If this figure is correct, it will mean
that there will be about one lawyer for every 275 people in the United States by the year 2000.
See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (117th ed. 1997).
2. It is noteworthy that both presidential candidates of the two major political parties
in the 1996 U.S. election, as well as their spouses, were lawyers.
3. See, e.g., Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv.
L. REV. 193 (1890).
4. See, e.g., ROBERT E.KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE
TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965) (suggesting
the introduction of "no fault" auto insurance as a partial substitute for the tort system in certain
vehicular accidents which a number of states have adopted).
5. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Lani GuinierJoins Faculty Of Law School At Harvard,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1998, at A12.
Lani Guinier, one of the nation's most eminent and outspoken legal
scholars on issues of race and sex, and whose nomination as Assistant
Attorney General for civil rights was withdrawn by President Clinton in
a political storm in 1993, has been named a professor with tenure at
Harvard Law School, the first black woman to hold such a position
there....
The number of minority and women faculty members at Harvard Law
School was an issue of fierce contention during the 1980s when the
school was ideologically driven....
In addition to Ms. Guinier, there are now 5 black members of the
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occasionally, sued when they are perceived as falling short of appropriate

inclusion." Only a generation ago, female law professors were a rarity.
Women now have a discernible presence in law schools,7 and in the legal
profession both in their absolute numbers and percentages of the number of
Harvard Law faculty, all men, and 11 women, all white, a situation that
has eased tensions considerably within the faculty.
Mr. Clark [Harvard Law dean], in announcing Ms. Guinier's
appointment, said he expected it to "help the school attract other top
scholars of diverse backgrounds, including more women of color."
Id. See also, Derrick Bell, At Last, HarvardSees the Light, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1998, at A23.
There has been a breakthrough at Harvard Law School. It has hired
Lani Guinier as its first tenured black female professor....
Back in 1971, when I became the first tenured black faculty member in
the 150-year history of the law school, I asked Harvard officials why they
didn't hire more minorities. The answer was always a variation on the
theme, "We can't find any qualified candidates." I was an exception,
Harvard assured me....
But over the years, I realized that many law schools, including Harvard,
judge candidates using criteria that do not accurately predict their ability
to teach or publish. Schools want professors with a degree from a major
law school, a ranking near the top of one's class, service as a Supreme
Court clerk and perhaps a few years of work at a big law firm.

Id.

6.

See, e.g., Harvard Settling Suit Alleging Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1993, at B 11.
To settle a suit with a former professor who said she was denied tenure
because of her sex, Harvard Law School is contributing $260,000 to help
her establish an institute that will provide free legal services to battered
women.
Prof. Clare Dalton, who is married to Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich,
sued Harvard in 1987 for discrimination when five male professors were
granted tenure but she was not. Professor Dalton, who is now tenured at
the Northeastern University School of Law, reached an out-of-court
settlement with Harvard on Monday.
Harvard agreed to contribute $260,000 to the Domestic Violence
Institute, a joint venture between Harvard and Northeastern, which will
provide free legal services to battered women. Professor Dalton will be
executive director of the institute....
Robert C. Clark, the dean of Harvard Law School, said the university's
reasons for settling were pragmatic. "The main reason to settle was to
avoid having to drag the faculty through what looked like a media circus,"
he said.
7. See Emily M. Bernstein, Law School Women Question the Teaching, N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 1996, at B 10. "In the 179 law schools accredited by the American Bar Association,
women make up 28 percent of faculty and administrative positions, and 16 percent of tenured
faculty." Id. See also, Tamar Lewin, Georgetown PresidentEnds Push to Replace Law School
Dean, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1998, at B11. "In the face of protests from alumni, faculty and
students, the president of Georgetown University has backed down from his decision to replace
Judith Areen, the dean who has guided the law school to growing wealth, prominence and
autonomy." Id. But see Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at
One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1994).
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law degrees conferred in the United States.' One indication that the status of

women in law is rising would be a finding that they earn salaries

commensurate with their abilities and accomplishments. The opening
scenario suggests that there is great skepticism about the congruence between
scholarship and salaries in law schools. This study examines if there is such
congruence and, further, if there is a statistically discernible gender effect on

law professors' salaries and, if so, if it is unfair.
A final reason for studying law faculty salaries is to make suggestions
to improve law school management. Today's university administrators face

the reality of "rankings."9 Just as athletic teams are ranked, law programs and

other professional schools are ranked by various self-anointed judges of

academic merit who populate the market-based landscape in U.S. society. In
such a milieu, business leaders and even educators question whether U.S.
educational institutions are making effective use of their resources.' ° There
8. See STATISTICALABSTRAcT OFTHE UNrrED STATES 194(117th ed. 1997). In 1960,
there were 9,240 law degrees conferred by 134 law schools in the United States, of which 2.5%
were awarded to women. In 1970, 145 law schools in the United States conferred 14,916
degrees, of which 5.4% were received by women. Note the percentage of law degrees for
women had more than doubled in a decade. The percentage going to women increased almost
six times to 30.2% of the 35,647 in 1980. By 1990, women had received 42.2% of the 36,485
law degrees awarded by U.S. law schools that year. This percentage has held relatively steady
for 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994 with 40,044 degrees awarded in 1994 and women having
received 43% of them. Id.
9. See, e.g., Ted Gest, Top Schools, U.S. NEWS & WoRD REPORT, Mar. 10, 1997, at
76. See also, Jan Hoffman, Judge Not, Law Schools Demand of a Magazine that Ranks Them,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1998, at Al.
Emotional distress. Loss of income. Grave injury to bragging rights.
These are only some of the damages that law school deans predict will
occur when U.S. News & World Report releases its annual ranking of the
nation's programs later this week....
It used to be considered bad form for those being ranked to
acknowledge even that they deigned to read surveys. But at a press
conference yesterday in Manhattan, about 10 deans, who were by turns
angry, indignant, wounded and walloped, signaled a very different
reaction: "The rankings clearly matter," said Pamela Gann, dean of Duke
University's law school (No.10 in 1997). "They are extremely widely
read and extremely widely relied upon."
Id.
10. See, e.g., Samuel Weiss, College AccreditorsFeeling Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 1994, at A19.
For almost a century, the oversight of colleges, universities and
professional schools in this country has rested largely with a group of
private accrediting organizations, whose judgments usually went
unchallenged and carried the academic equivalent of the Good
Housekeeping seal of approval....
"The credibility of voluntary accreditation has sunk so low that we
have to do something dramatic if it's going to survive," said Dr. Robert
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is a public perception that universities and professional schools could be

managed better than at present." Support for this notion comes from
economic data showing that the consumer price indices for higher education
far outstrip that of the general urban economy. 2 Because law schools are part
of universities, their management should be scrutinized. Flawed though they
may be, the rankings are a proxy for determining whether or not law schools
are well-managed. Studying law school salary administration may identify
areas which could be improved, thereby providing faculty members with
incentive to direct their talents to goals that will enhance a school's ranking.
Throughout this paper, references will be made to the introductory scenario
to determine if our study supports or undercuts the assertions of the
participants in that apocryphal discussion regarding law school management.

E. Atwell, co-chairman of the meeting and president of the American
Council on Education, which represents 1800 institutions....
Dr. Stephen S. Weiner, executive director of the Accrediting
Commission for Senior Colleges and Universities for the Western
Association of Schools and Colleges, said new standards of accreditation
could come out of the Tucson meeting.
"The issue," Dr. Weiner said, "is whether the accrediting associations
will continue simply to insure minimum standards" or whether "we'll
deliver on the promise we've made to insure real educational quality."
Id. See also Louis Gerstner, Jr., Our Schools Are Failing. Do We Care?, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
1994, at A27.
11. See, e.g., William H. Honan, Panel Suggests Ways to Trim Cost of College, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 1998, at A26.
After weathering a battle with its Congressional sponsors and
repeatedly postponing the issuance of a report because of internal strife,
a Federal commission to study the cost of higher education today all but
unanimously adopted 42 recommendations intended to make college less
expensive....
Important recommendations in the 53 page report include these:
-Colleges must disclose more financial information to help prospective
students and their parents better understand college costs and financial
aid...
-Colleges should be encouraged to reduce costs by concentrating on a
few priority areas where excellence can be sustained and by entering into
"cost-saving partnerships ......
Id.
12. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 488-89 (117th ed. 1997). The
consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) for selected items and groups from 1985
to 1996 showed the following: for all items the index was 107.6 for 1985, whereas the college
tuition index for the same year was 119.9; for 1990 the all item index had risen to 130.7. while
the college tuition index for that year was 175; in 1996 the all item index was 156.9, while the
college tuition index for that year was 279.8. Id.
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I.

GENERAL STATE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND THEIR SUPPORT
FOR HIGHER EDUCATION

The three states in which the public law schools in this study reside are
relatively prosperous. Each has a gross state product which places it
approximately among
the top third of the states, and two of the three states are
3
states.1
quartile
top
Despite overall state wealth, there are distributive problems in terms of
personal income for the states whose law schools comprise this study.
Schools A, B, and C are all in states with high gaps between top and bottom
quintile family incomes. 4 Regarding personal income per capita, School A
is in a third quartile state, while Schools B and C are in second quartile
states. 15

With respect to state appropriations for current operations of public
colleges, School A is in a state near the 60th percentile, School B is in a top
10% state, and School C is in a top 12% state.1 6 Regarding net tuition
revenues, School A is in a state near the median, School B is in the top 20%
of states, and School C is in the top 4% of states. 7 Given these higher
education funding data, it would appear that State A does not believe in public
education as much as either State B, which generates very high state
appropriations and moderately high tuition, or State C, which is a high
appropriation and very high tuition state.
II.
A.

THE LAW SCHOOLS IN THIS STUDY

GENERAL DEMOGRAPHICS

The subjects in this study are the faculty of three law schools in major
state universities in the United States. Because this study examines the
association of legal scholarship and faculty salaries, law schools were selected
to mitigate differences in state economies and school missions. Although each
school is in a different state, each is a public law school ranked in the top
quartile of the 179 accredited U.S. law schools" where academic reputation,

13. Id. at 450. We use the "chained" or 1992 dollar measurement. The particular states
are not disclosed to preserve institutional anonymity.
14.

See Richard Perez-Pena, Study Shows New York Has Greater Income Gap, N.Y.

15.

STATISTICALABSTRACTOFTHEUNTEDSTATES 457 (117th ed. 1997).

TIMEs, Dec. 17,1997, at Al.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 186.
Id.
Gest, supra note 9, at 76.
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and more specifically, faculty scholarship, is a significant component of that
ranking.1 9 Presumably, at top quartile schools there are pressures on academic

administrators to maintain and improve the schools' rankings to justify
continued public support.' Hence, this study has selected one approximately
top twenty, one approximately top thirty, and one approximately top forty law
school in U.S. News and World Report's 1996/97 ranking of law schools.2
Table 1 below presents demographic data for the three schools.
School A is the smallest of the three law schools in terms of number of
professorial faculty and C is the largest. The professorial faculty, excluding
deans and associate deans, for the years under study' numbered 28 for School
A, 38 for University B, and 50 for University C. The bulk of the faculty at B
and C are full professors, comprising about 75% of B's faculty and over 80%
of C's, but only about 33% of A's. Because of its paucity of full professors,
A did have the most associates with over half of its faculty occupying this
rank, compared to only 4 at B and none at C. Rank has become less

significant relative to tenure at many law schools in recent times owing to the
high cost of young faculty.

19. Perhaps it was coincidental, but each of the three universities whose law school is
included in this study also has had teams regularly among the top twenty in football rankings.
This study could also be seen as implicitly asking the question, "Can a university's law school
be run as well as its football team?"
20. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 9, at Al.
The deans at yesterday's announcement said that every spring, as the
magazine unlooses its ratings, the response is immediate and deafening.
State legislatures adjust their budgets for the home-grown public schools
upward or downward. Faculty morale trembles. Alumni contributions
gush or dry up. Law firm partners, looking for graduates from the best
schools, adjust their sights.
Id. atB8.
21. Gest, supra note 9, at 76.
22. Individual faculty in this study were those at School A in 1995/96, School B in
1994/95 and School C in 1993/94. Raw salary data for individual faculty members were for
academic year 1995/96 for School A, 1994/95 for School B, and 1993/94 for School C. Salaries
of the schools were "adjusted" to 1995/96 levels for Schools B and C by calling budget officials
at B and C and obtaining each law school's raise pool for 1995/96 for B and 1994/95 and
1995/96 for C and then adjusting the salaries of B and C.
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Table 1
DemographicData
Law School A

Law School B

Law School C

Adjusted Salary

86,283
(15,950)

90,961
(16,472)

125,935
(29,765)

Years of Service

12.71
(8.89)

19.82
(12.27)

18.98
(9.31)

6.39
(10.54)

5.82
(5.74)

10.74
(7.85)

159.46
(182.08)

182.71
(180.09)

305.84
(241.47)

3.46
(4.96)

3.58
(3.47)

6.14
(5.14)

122.04
(138.44)

150.42
(142.49)

209.82
(184.86)

3.11
(4.61)

3.00
(2.48)

5.26
(5.01)

111.04
(131.31)

132.71
(120.29)

170.62
(177.46)

Joint & Solo Law Review Hits
at Outside Law Reviews

2.57
(4.11)

3.05
(3.20)

5.02
(4.74)

Joint & Solo Law Review
Pages at Outside Law Reviews

81.25
(113.40)

126.37
(136.01)

157.66
(159.26)

Solo Law Review Hits at
Outside Law Reviews

2.29
(3.77)

2.47
(2.19)

4.26
(4.59)

Solo Law Review Hit Rate at
Outside Law Reviews

0.28
(0.45)

0.54
(1.19)

0.24
(0.29)

73.82
(107.08)

108.45
(113.27)

127.70
(154.35)

10.01
(16.96)

26,79
(71.84)

7.67
(10.88)

female: 7
male: 21

female: 8
male: 30

female: 9
male: 41

Asst. Prof.: 0
Assoc. Prof.: 17
Full Prof.: 11

Asst. Prof.: 5
Assoc. Prof.: 4
Full Prof.: 29

Asst. Prof.: 7
Assoc. Prof.: 0
Full Prof.: 43

60.53%

72.00%

mean
(std. dev.)

LegalTrac Hits (number)
LegalTrac Pages
Joint & Solo Law Review Hits
Joint & Solo Law Review
Pages
Solo Law Review Hits
Solo Law Review Pages

Solo Law Review Pages at
Outside Law Reviews
Solo Law Review Page Rate at
Outside Law Reviews
Gender
Academic Rank

Law Review Faculty (percent)

71.43%

mean
(std. dev.)

mean
(std. dev.)
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Using U.S. News & World Report's 1997 ratings of law schools,23
University A's law school is in the forties overall, in the fifties according to
reputation by academics, and is considered in the sixties according to lawyers
and judges. University B is rated in the thirties by academics, but in the
forties by judges and lawyers. University C's law school is ranked as among
the top twenty or better schools by academics, judges, and lawyers.
This study selects factors one might speculate would correlate with
faculty salaries at the three schools and applies correlation and regression
analysis to such data to see if such ruminations are supported by empirical
evidence. Attributes we posited as potential candidates for independent
variables influencing salaries include: relative salary level for the particular
law school; quality of the individual faculty member's academic record;
amount and quality of legal research published; seniority; and gender. These
factors are discussed below.
Referring to the opening scenario, it is difficult to verify Dean Hoyle's
point about the lack of public financial support for professional education for
Schools A, B, or C because the StatisticalAbstract data on higher education
funding are not refined to reflect specific areas of higher education such as
professional schools. Clearly Schools B and C are in states providing greater
resources for higher education than A. Each school is in a state among,
approximately, the top third in terms of aggregate wealth and therefore has the
potential for providing ample appropriations for higher education.24 Dean
Hoyle's observation regarding the lack of support for higher education would
thus appear accurate for State and School A because the school is in the top
quartile among accredited law schools for the year considered. However, the
state is only among the top third in support for higher education, so, arguably,
School A is outperforming its resources. Lack of state financial commitment
is not true for B or C.
B.

SALARY LEVELS OF THE SCHOOLS

Noteworthy items in Table 1 about the salary levels of the individual
schools include the fact that University C pays its law faculty much higher
salaries than either A or B. For the year under study, the adjusted mean salary
at C is $125,935, while it is $86,283 at A and $90,961 at B. 25 The fact that all
23.

Gest, supra note 9, at 76.

See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 186 (117th ed. 1997).
25. The authors have in their possession the 1995/96 salaries for Law School A, the
1994/95 salaries for School B, and the 1993/94 salaries for School C. We adjusted the salaries
of Schools B and C to 1995/96 levels by contacting law school administrators at Schools B and
C to learn what the raise pool was in percentage terms for year 1995/96 for B and years 1994/95
24.
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three schools are public institutions makes this disparity all the more striking.
The standard deviation for salaries is $29,765 at C, as compared to $15,950
for A and $16,472 for B. This means there is a wider dispersion of salaries at
C than at either A or B.26 Table 7 further shows that not only are faculty at C
better paid than at A or B, but also that this salary differential is statistically
significant with p-values equal to 0.0001.27
C.

FACULTY QUALITY

Quality measures of the three faculties used here are the rank of the law
school from which individual faculty received his or her juris doctor degree
and whether individual faculty members held law review membership while
in law school.
With respect to the quality of the institution from which they received
their degrees, 89.29% at A received their degrees from a top decile law school,
42.11% were in this category at School B, and 80% at School C. Given the
fact that seven members of School C's faculty had foreign law degrees or
Ph.D.s, omitting these faculty resulted in 93.02% of School C's faculty having
top decile degrees.
Law review membership is also a measure of faculty quality. Typically,
law review membership is offered to those who rank academically in the top
10% of their class at the end of the first year of law school. In addition to
"grading on," some schools allow students to become law review members by

and 1995/96 for C. We then used these figures to calculate the salaries to comparable 1995/96
levels. We acknowledge some imprecision in doing this owing to the fact that we assumed all
faculty at a particular school would receive the same percentage raises for the adjusted years.
Our figures are imprecise to the extent that raises were not given uniformly at each school.
Also, some faculty at Schools B and C did in fact change during the years under study.
Nonetheless, so few changed at B and C-coupled with the fact that aggregate statistical
measures were employed as the basis for our analysis--that we feel justified in pursuing this
analysis. By way of comparing law professors' salaries to those of the general population, the
median money income of households in the United States for 1995, the most recent year for
which data is available, was $34,075. STATisTIcAL ABsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 468
(117th ed.1997). However, the salaries of partners of major law firms are in the middle six to
seven figures. Table 7 also supports the conclusion that C's faculty are paid better than at either
A or B. However, Table 7 reveals that salaries at Schools A and B are not significantly different
statistically as the p-value equals 0.4027. See Table 7, located in the Appendix, infra.
26. Tables 5 to 10, located in the Appendix, infra, report the results of two regression
models. The regression models include nested terms, that is, "years" is nested within "law
school," the "solo outside hit/page rate" is nested within the "law school," and the interaction
of "years" with the "solo outside hit/page rate" is nested within the "particular law school."
"Nesting" means that each of these variables was evaluated at each individual law school rather
than for all three law schools combined.
27. See Table 7, infra.
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"writing on" after their first year of law school. For the three law schools'
faculty in this study, 71.3% at A, 60.53% at B, and 85.71% at C were law
review members.28
Further measures of faculty quality included having clerked for a
Supreme Court justice, having been editor-in-chief or president of a law
review, having graduated first in one's law class, having a Ph.D., or having
been an associate or partner in a prestigious law firm. These measures were
not used in our regression or correlation'analyses. However, an examination
of The AALS Directoryof Law Teachers 1996-97 reveals that several faculty
at School C but none at A or B had clerked for a Supreme Court justice or
have a Ph.D.
In general, the faculties of all three law schools in this study are
composed of individuals who are intellectually superior to both the general
population and the general legal profession, as evidenced by the quality of law
schools attended and class ranking at those schools. The overall quality of the
faculty at C is higher than at either A or B, while School A's faculty quality
appears slightly higher than B's in terms of decile of school from which the
juris doctor was received and in terms of having more faculty who held law
review membership. B's faculty are more experienced than A's as evidenced
by the higher median years of service.29
Referring above to the opening scenario, when Dean Hoyle observes that
the law school goes to great lengths to hire qualified faculty, the data in this
study generally support his point.30 The high percentage of faculty who
graduated from top law schools at A and C, coupled with the large percentage
at all three schools who also held law review membership as students, all
support the assertion that the faculties at all three schools are composed of
high quality individuals. With respect to Dean Hoyle's facially unkind remark
to Professor George Smith stating that Smith lacked a law review certificate
which is a recognized measure of law faculty excellence, Dean Hoyle is
partially correct at best. Table 11 reveals no statistically significant effect on
the salary of those having a law review certificate.3 Table 11 does show that
having been a law review member does enhance the explanatory power of the

28. The figures for C were adjusted because several of School C's faculty have Ph.D.s
instead of law degrees and, also, a few have degrees from foreign law schools where the law
review plays little or no part in academic distinguishment. If all of C's faculty were considered
eligible for law review membership, including those manifestly not qualified because they hold
non-law degrees or foreign law degrees, the percentage of C's faculty holding law review
membership would be 72%. Adjusted, the "law review" faculty rises to 85.7 1%.
29. See Table 1.
30. But see discussion infra Part II, F.
31. Table 11, infra Part 11, E.
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model by approximately 4.4%, suggesting such a credential has monetary

value.32 However, Table 11 also indicates that this variable itself is not
statistically significant in determining pay.33 Thus, when Dean Hoyle states
that a faculty member's law review certificate has market value, data in

support of this claim are scant. It might be argued that having such a
certificate is important in obtaining a position as a law professor, which would
appear true given the fact that a majority of faculty in each school in this study
were law review members while students, but thereafter, other factors
predominate in explaining law faculty salaries. The data in Table 11 support
Professor Smith's statement that academic excellence earned "a generation
ago is long forgotten." Salary data here do not provide statistically significant
support for assigning monetary worth to such a credential.
D.

LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

Measuring scholarly research and relating this to salary is a major
objective of this study. Table 1 contains indicia of scholarly research.' The
publication data in this study are derived from LegalTrac, which is a
computerized data base of legal scholarship. Data used in this study cover the
period from July 1980 to January 1996.
Scholarly measures start with the number of "LegalTrac Hits," the
number of articles published by a law professor. This is the least rigorous
measure, and it includes bar journal articles, symposia, book reviews and law

32. See id.
33. See id. (p-value of law review membership when added to the base model is
0.4333).
34. See Table I,supra Part II, A. LegalTrac, a computerized data base starting in July
1980 and going to January 1, 1996, was utilized in this study to ascertain legal scholarship,
since salaries used were from 1995/96. The specific measures of legal scholarship employed,
as shown in Table 1, are: number of articles recognized in LegalTrac ("LegalTrac Hits"); total
pages in all LegalTrac articles ("LegalTrac Pages"); number of solo and jointly authored law
review articles ("Joint & Solo Law Review Hits"); number of solo and joint law review pages
("Joint & Solo Law Review Pages"); solo law review articles recognized in LegalTrac ("Solo
Law Review Hits"); solo law review pages recognized in LegalTrac ("Solo Law Review
Pages"); joint and solo law review articles published in outside journals recognized by
LegalTrac ("Joint & Solo Law Review Hits at Outside Law Reviews"); number of joint and solo
law review pages published in outside journals recognized by LegalTrac ("Joint & Solo Law
Review Pages at Outside Law Reviews"); number of solo law review articles published in
outside journals recognized by LegalTrac ("Solo Law Review Hits at Outside Law Reviews");
the solo law review hit rate at outside journals ("Solo Law Review Hit Rate at Outside Law
Reviews"); the number of solo law review pages published in outside journals ("Solo Law
Review Pages at Outside Journals"); and the average number of pages produced each year by
a professor whose completed article is later published in an outside journal ("Solo Law Review
Page Rate at Outside Law Reviews").
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reviews. Law review articles should count more than bar journal articles
given their greater development. A "Joint Law Review Hit," which is a coauthored article published in a law review, represents greater scholarly
accomplishment than a bar journal article, symposia, book review, or law
review testimonial. However, solo law review articles, "Solo Law Review
Hits" and "Solo Law Review Pages," are more rigorous than joint law review
articles because the article represents the work of one person rather than a
team. Law review articles published at law schools outside the local law
review, "Solo Law Review Hits at Outside Journals" and "Solo Law Review
Hit Rate at Outside Journals," are considered even more stringent "market
tests" than those published "in house" by a school's law review journal. The
publication of an article in an outside law journal is more stringent because
the publication of an article "in house" may be the product of the student
editors' desire to curry favor with local faculty. Arguably, the most refined
productivity measure of scholarship is pages written and published in outside
law reviews, "Solo Law Review Pages at Outside Journals" and "Solo Law
Review Page Rate." Some variant of page counts is a recognized measure of
law faculty research productivity." After expending considerable effort to
refine measures of legal scholarship, which are reflected in Table 1, the data
reveal a high degree of correlation and significance level among virtually all
unadjusted scholarly productivity measures for "hits" and pages.36
The analyses reported in Tables 5 to 10 use either the "solo outside law
review hit rate" or the "solo outside law review page rate" as productivity
measures.37 This position is taken because: 1) use of only one productivity
measure avoids multicollinearity problems which would occur if more than
one scholarly productivity measure were used; 2) productivity rates, rather
than absolute productivity measures, adjust for the amount of time each
faculty member has been employed as an academic, and they compensate for
higher publication pressure on recently hired probationary faculty and for the
greater administrative loads often delegated to senior faculty. Also, using
scholarly productivity rates allows better tests of whether continuing
publication output is rewarded at all levels of seniority.

35. See, e.g., Olavi Maru, Measuring the Impact of Legal Periodicals,AM. B. FOUND.
L. RES. J. 227 (1976).
36. See Tables 2 and 4, located in the Appendix, infra. For example, solo outside law
review pages, considered a stringent measure of legal scholarship correlated highly, 0.8253,
with LegalTrac pages, the laxest scholarly measure, with high statistical significance where the
p-value equals 0.0000. See Table 2, infra. Thus, it makes little difference in the analysis
whether a lax or stringent scholarly productivity measure is used.
37. Tables 5 through 10 are located in the Appendix, infra.
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The base regression model depicted in Table 5 shows the results of
multiple regression models with seniority and scholarly productivity examined
by institution, that is, "nested" within the institution.38 Tables 5 to 7 use
"solo outside law review hit rate" as the dependent variable39 and Tables 8 to
10 use "solo outside law review page rate" as the dependent variable.' In
other words, within the same school, what are the effects of seniority and
scholarship on a faculty member's salary? In Table 5, the F of 39.96 is for the
full model. 4' The F value for seniority is F (3, 115) equals 30.27 with a pvalue of 0.0001.42 In non-technical terms, the F statistic for seniority of 30.27
with its associated p-value of 0.0001 indicates that seniority by itself is the
main determinant of salary and that it is highly significant as there is one
chance in ten thousand that this result occurred randomly.43 In contrast, the
F value (3, 115) for scholarly productivity alone, "Solo Outside LR Hit Rate,"
is 1.83 with a p-value of 0.1469." These data indicate that scholarship by
itself is not a statistically significant determinant of salary. When, however,
the interaction of seniority and scholarship is examined at individual schools,
represented as "Years*Solo Out LR Hit Rate (Institution)," this interaction of
seniority and scholarship nested within individual schools is found to be a
statistically significant determinant of salary as F (3, 115) equals 3.93 with a
p-value of 0.0106. 45 Such data are statistically significant and tell us that
seniority and scholarship together are correlated with salary. Continuing in
Table 5, "Institution" is not statistically significant as correlated with salary
where F (2, 115) equals 1.11 with a p-value of 0.3321.46 The base model
depicted in Table 5, therefore, indicates that seniority is the major and highly
significant salary correlate and shows that the interaction of seniority with
scholarly productivity, represented as "Years*Solo Out LR Hit Rate
(Institution)" with a p-value equal to 0.0106, is also a statistically significant
correlate of salary.47
The effect of the combination of multiple independent variables on an
independent variable is referred to as an "interaction effect." Use of this
38. Table 5, infra.
39. See Tables 5 to 7, infra.
40. See Tables 8 to 10, infra.
41. Table 5, infra.
42. Id. Note that 2+3+3+3=11, representing the degrees of freedom used by the entire
model; and 11+104=115, which represents the total degrees of freedom available, i.e., the
number of observations in the data.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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technique is portrayed at the bottom of Table 6 with the segment "Years*Solo
Outside LR Hit Rate (Institution). '4 These data answer the question, "If we
took two professors with the same seniority at the same school with different
scholarly productivity rates, what would be the impact on their salary of this
difference in their scholarly productivity?" The bottom portion of Table 6
answers this question at Schools A and C by saying that there would be a
$1,970.00 positive impact on salary at A and a $2,753.73 positive impact on
salary at C.49 The results at C have a high degree of statistical significance
where the p-value equals 0.0058.50 Results at School B are not statistically
significant as the p-value equals 0.4432, but School A has a p-value of 0.0745,
which is marginally significant.5 ' Thus, there are two schools, A and C, which
show up as places where scholarly productivity will be rewarded at a given
level of seniority. In effect, legal scholarship is not taken into account in any
statistically significant way post-tenure at School B. This is curious given the
fact that B is a top quartile institution where maintaining and improving the
school's ranking, particularly among academics and the judiciary, is
instrumental in increasing the school's overall rating.
A law school's mean scholarly productivity tended to follow salary in
this study. In almost every measure of scholarly activity shown in Table 1,
School C's mean scholarly productivity measure exceeded that of School A
or B. 2 C's faculty had a mean of 10.74 LegalTrac hits, A's was second with
6.39, and B's faculty was last with 5.82.5 LegalTrac pages told a similar
story with C's mean at 305.84, but here B's faculty outperformed A's with a
mean of 182.71 to A's 159.4604 The mean joint and solo law review hits, as
well as pages, were higher for C than either A or B." In only two scholarly
productivity measures did A and B outperform C, and both related to faculty
publication in outside journals. Using the measure of "Solo Law Review Hit
Rate at Outside Law Reviews," C's mean rate of 0.24 was lower compared to
A's mean rate of 0.28 and B's mean rate of 0.54.6 This means that the
average faculty member at C publishes at an outside law review once every
four years, about the same at A, and once every two years at B. In a related
48.

See Table 6, infra.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The p-value at A is of a two-tailed test, and because we are hypothesizing a
particular direction, we can legitimately divide the p-value by 2, which would yield a value
below 0.05, which is within the traditional cutoff for statistical significance.
52. See Table 1,supra.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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measure, "Solo Law Review Page Rate at Outside Law Reviews," C's faculty,
with a mean rate of 7.67 pages per year, trailed A's mean rate of 10.01 and B's
mean rate of 26.79. 57 Because C's faculty outproduced faculty at either A or
B in terms of total law review articles and pages, this means C's faculty
published in the local law review to a greater extent than did faculty at A or
B. The propensity of School C's faculty to publish "in house" is
understandable given that law reviews tend to have a ranking similar to that
of the associated school and the desire of law professors to publish in "high
impact" law reviews, which C's law review clearly is.
One other statistic regarding scholarly productivity worthy of note is the
standard deviation, a dispersion measure. A high number indicates that some
faculty are producing considerably above the mean while others are doing
little or nothing. The considerably lower mean seniority at A coupled with the
high standard deviation indicates that a substantial number of faculty at A face
pre-tenure publication pressure." The standard deviation for "Solo Law
Review Hits" suggests wide productivity variations for individual faculty at
all three schools.59 The same phenomenon holds for "Solo Law Review Hit
Rate at Outside Law Reviews" and "Solo Law Review Page Rate at Outside
Law Reviews."' Such high standard deviations, when compared to the mean,
indicate that some faculty at all three schools produce a great deal while others
produce little or nothing. In fact, there were faculty at all three schools who
had not produced a page of law review research in over fifteen and a half
years.
Anecdotally, and interestingly, the single most productive law faculty
researchers at each school in this study were not law review members while
students. While this appears to be an anomaly, it does raise the matter
suggested by Professor Bell to the effect that a law faculty composed mainly
of men who were top law students, became Supreme Court clerks, who spent
time in a large law firm, and then returned to academe, is deserving of
reconsideration.6 ' Certainly excellence in some form, be it academic,
57.

Id.

58. See id.
59. Id. The standard deviation at A was 4.61 with a mean of 3.11, while B's standard
deviation was 2.48 with a mean of 3.00 and C's standard deviation was 5.01 with a mean of
5.26. Id.
60. See id. For "Solo Law Review Hit Rate at Outside Law Reviews," A has a standard
deviation of 0.45 and a mean of 0.28, B's standard deviation is 1.19 with a mean of 0.54 and
C has a standard deviation of 0.29 with a mean of 0.24. For "Solo Law Review Page Rate at
Outside Law Reviews," A has a standard deviation of 16.96 with a mean of 10.01, B's standard
deviation is 71.84 with a mean of 26.79 and C has a standard deviation of 10.88 with a mean
of 7.67.
61. See Bell, supra note 5.
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professional, or scholarly publishing, is necessary for a professor, but given
the increased impact the positive law has on all segments of society, thought
should be given to broadening the background of persons who teach
succeeding generations of lawyers. Having the traditional qualities of
outstanding scholarship and professional exposure with top firms is desirable,
but having representatives from different demographic groups should also play
a part in faculty selection, and, interestingly, as this study shows, it does not
preclude persons lacking premium academic credentials from making many
scholarly contributions.
This study both supports and undermines certain of Dean Hoyle's
observations about legal scholarship and law school compensation policy.
Support is provided in Table 6 for Hoyle's assertion that salary is positively
62
affected by scholarship, at least at Schools A and C.
The base model depicted in Table 5 supports Professor Jones' assertions
that legal research in the form of solo outside law review hit rate by itself is
not statistically associated with salary. Dean Hoyle is, in these schools, both
right and wrong when he claims that legal scholarship affects faculty
compensation. Legal scholarship does show up as a statistically significant
correlate of salary when combined with seniority, 63 but in terms of its relative
importance as a salary correlate, scholarship is trivial.' The factor with
overwhelming correlation to salary at all three schools is seniority. 6' The data
do support Dean Hoyle's assertion that publication does positively affect
salary because for faculty at the same institution with the same number of
years of service, those with higher publication rates receive higher salaries,
66
which is statistically significant at Schools A and C.
E.

SENIORITY

Seniority refers to length of service at an organization. Good faith
seniority systems are defenses to discrimination charges under the Civil Rights

62. See Table 6, infra. Specifically, at the bottom of Table 6, "Years*Solo Outside LR
Hit Rate (Institution)" we see that at all three universities there is a positive income effect of
research productivity for two people having the same seniority at the same institution with
different hit rates ($1970.00 at A, $830.00 at B, and $2753.00 at C), but these results are
significant only at University C where p equals 0.0058 and marginally significant at A where
the p-value equals 0.0745. Id.
63. See Table 5, infra.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Table 6, infra.
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Act of 196467 and under the Equal Pay Act amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.68
In terms of seniority, referring again to Table 1, Schools B and C have
faculties where the mean term of service approaches twenty years-B having
19.82 years and C having 18.98 years.' School A has a mean term of service
7
of 12.71 years and thus is less experienced than the faculty at B or C." The
spread of service, or standard deviation, among faculty was 8.89 at A, 12.27
at B, and 9.31 at C, meaning that there is about 9 years of variation of faculty
service at A and C and about 12 at B. 7'
To study the effects of seniority on faculty salary, this study has built
two regression models, the first of which is presented in Tables 5 through 7.72
Tables 5 through 10 report detailed results of multiple regression models with
seniority and scholarly productivity examined by institution, that is, "nested"
within each institution. Tables 5 through 7 use solo outside law review hit
rate as the dependent variable whereas Tables 8 through 10 use solo outside
page rate. Table 11 shows the effect on the model presented in Tables 5
through 7 of deleting solo outside hit rate or adding one of four independent
variables: gender, local degree, decile of rank of the institution from which
a faculty member obtained his or her law degree, and law review
membership. 3
Table 5 reveals that the model R squared explains 0.8087 of salary using
seniority and scholarly productivity as independent variables with salary being
the dependent variable. 74 This model with a p-value of 0.0001 gives
considerable confidence that the model explains salary variations.

67. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994).
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994).
69. Table 1, supra.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Tables 5 to 7, infra. See also Tables 8 to 10, infra, for the second model which
is substantially equivalent to the first model except that it uses a slightly different scholarly
productivity rate, solo outside law review publication page rate rather than "hit" rate.
73. See Table 11, infra.
74. Table 5, infra.
75. Id. Because Tables 8, 9, and 10 simply reinforce the results obtained in Tables 5,
6, and 7 using the slightly different scholarly productivity measure of solo outside law review
page rate, Tables 8, 9, and 10 are placed in the article's Appendix. The model R squared
developed in Table 8 yielded a 0.8006, meaning that about 80% of salary is explained by using
the independent variables of seniority, represented as "Years(Institution)," and solo outside law
review page rate, represented as "Solo Outside LR Page Rate(Institution)," with a very high
statistical significance level of 0.0001. This figure means there is only one chance in 10,000 that
this result was obtained by chance.
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Table 6 refines the factors of years of service, namely seniority, and
scholarly productivity, represented by the label "Solo Outside LR Hit Rate
(Institution)," as they affect salary by institution.7 6 In Table 6, seniority shows
up as a highly significant predictor of salary where the T value for A is 3.63
and the p-value is 0.0004, B's T value is 4.13 with a p-value of 0.0001 and a
T value of 7.78 with a p-value of 0.0001 for C. 71 In general, the higher the T
value, coupled with the fact it is positive, indicates that the greater the
seniority, the greater the salary. Table 9 reaffirms this assertion.7"
The effects of seniority appear in Tables 5, 6" and 11. Seniority has an
enormous influence on salary and is by far the dominant factor at all three
schools in this study. In Table 5, years at a particular institution has an F
value of 39.96 with a high significance factor of 0.0001, meaning there is one
chance in 10,000 that this occurred randomly.8" Further, of the F statistics in
Table 5, years at an institution was by far the largest value of the four factors
considered.8" These four factors were institution, years at the particular
institution, scholarship, signified as "Solo Outside LR Hit Rate (Institution),"
and the combination of seniority and productivity.82
Perhaps Table 6's most telling data on the impact of seniority on salary
occurs under "Years (Institution)" in the left column, under which are listed
the three schools.83 The "Estimate" column adjacent to "Years (Institution)"
provides a dollar value per year for each year of seniority at that particular
school." Thus, each year of seniority is worth $1,242.76 at School A, slightly
less at $918.68 at B, and $2,074.10 at C.85 Each of these figures is statistically
significant, 0.0004 at A, 0.0001 at B and C, meaning there is a four or one,
respectively, in 10,000 chance that these values appeared by chance. 6 Table

76. See Table 6, infra. Again, this is reinforced by the nearly identical results using the
slightly differing scholarly productivity rate in Table 9, infra.
77.

Table 6, infra.

81.
82.
83.

See id.
See id.
See Table 6, infra.

78. See Table 9, infra.
79. Note, essentially the same result occurs in Tables 8 and 9 using the second model
with page rate measure of scholarly productivity.
80. Table 5, infra.

84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Id. Table 6 also contains a measure of the dollar value of the "Solo Outside LR Hit
Rate (Institution)" immediately below the seniority data. Thus, at School A the rate at which
one produces law review articles negatively affects salary by $7307.46; at School B the negative
impact of law review publication rate is only $4,283.55; at School C the negative impact is
$19,477.41. However, these results are not statistically significant. Id.
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11 reinforces the conclusion that seniority is the dominant factor in salary
determination at all three schools.
Table 11
Summary of the Effects on the Base Model of Other PotentialDeterminants
of Salary
p-value of
Added Variable

R2

Change
in R2

Base Model

na

0.8087

na

Remove Terms With Solo
Outside LR Hit Rate (SOhR)

na

0.7659

-0.0428

Add Gender

0.8197

0.8104

0.0017

Add Local Degree

0.0725

0.8214

0.0127

Add Decile of Degree
Granting Law School

0.7004

0.8261

0.0174

Add Law Review (top 10%
of class)

0.4333

0.8528

0.0441

Change to Base Model
(nested within institution)

The R squared in Table 5 of 0.8087 means that the base model explains
almost 81% of the salary variation. 7 When one removes terms involving the
scholarly productivity, "Solo Outside LR Hit Rate," from the model, the
model R squared, which is the explanatory power of the model, is reduced by
less than 5%."s Thus, years of service at a particular institution standing alone
explains almost 77% of the approximately 81% of the variation of salary
explained by the base model.
Returning again to the introductory scenario, Dean Hoyle's remarks
about seniority being "a factor" but "not a significant factor" in his law
school's faculty compensation policy does not find support in this study.
Here, seniority is by any measure the overwhelming factor in law professors'

87.
88.

Table 5, infra.
Table 11, supra. The change in the R squared value of the base model is -0.0428.
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pay.89 The data at two schools in this study support Professor Jones' and
Smith's assertions that scholarship is only marginally recognized post-tenure
and that its impact on salary is small, but statistically significant.'
F.

GENDER

For the years under study, 9 7 out of the 28 professorial faculty at School
A were females, there were 8 females out of 38 at School B, and 9 out of 50
at School C.92 This study examines whether gender is a statistically
significant factor in the determination of law professors' salaries. Table 3a
below reveals some answers to this question.
The "salary" column and the "gender" row of that salary column reveal
a correlation of 0.2577 with a p-value of 0.005 which is statistically
significant.9 3 Because the correlation coefficient is positive, there is a positive
relationship between gender and salary, supporting the conclusion that males
receive higher salaries than females. Thus, on this point, Professor Jones
appears to be correct, for the moment, that there is a statistically significant
relationship between gender and salary, and that a bias against women exists.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See Tables 5, 6, 8, 9, infra, and 11, supra.
See Tables 5, 6, 8 and 9, infra.
1995/96 for School A, 1994/95 for School B, and 1993/94 for School C.
Table 1, supra.
Table 3a, supra.
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Table 3a

PersonalCharacteristicsand Solo Outside Law Review ProductivityMeasures
PearsonCorrelationsand Significance Levels
Solo

Adjusted
Salary
(AdjSal)
AdjSal

Years

Gender

Solo
Outside
LR
Page
Rate
(SOpR)

1.0000

(0.000)

Years

0.6293
(0.000)

0.6494
(0.000)

1.0000
(0.000)

Gender

0.2577
(0.005)

0.2136
(0.021)

0.2438
(0.008)

1.0000
(0.000)

SOh

0.3942
(0.000)

0.1994
(0.032)

0.0952
(0.309)

0.1434
(0.125)

SOhR

-0.2560

-0.4133

-0.3821

-0.1212

(0.006)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.195)

(0.025)

(0.186)

0.1235

-0.0224

(0.811)

(0.558)

-0.2603

-0.3820

-0.3292

-0.1617

0.2076

SOpR

Solo

Outside
Law
Review
Pages
(SOp)

1.0000

(0.000)

SOp

Solo
Outside
LR Hit
Rate
(SOhR)

(0.000)
0.5753

Rank

Rank

Outside
Law
Review
Hits
(SOb)

(0.005)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.0549

(0.083)

1.0000
(0.000)
0.3387

(0.000)
0.8434

(0.000)

0.2184

(0.019)

1.0000

(0.000)

0.4536

(0.000)
0.9635

(0.000)

1.0000

(0.000)
0.4012

(0.000)

1.0000

(0.000)

In Table 3a, rank was coded 1 for Assistant Professor, 2 for Associate
Professor, and 3 for Professor. Gender was coded 1 for female and 2 for male.
A statistically significant relationship between gender and rank also appears
in Table 3a. Referring to the "gender" row in the left most column and
moving over to the "rank" column in the gender row, there is a positive
correlation of 0.2136 between rank and gender with a p-value of 0.021.94 This
means that men are more likely to have higher academic rank than women,
and this is statistically significant. Again, this appears to support Professor
Jones' contention that there is gender discrimination relative to academic rank.
Another regression was run after adjusting for institution and years of
service, "Years (Institution)," producing an F value of 48.49 and a p-value of
0.0001. 9' This means that seniority at a particular institution is a very high

94.

95.

Id.

Table 3b, located in the Appendix, infra. The statistical model reported in Table
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predictor of salary as there is one chance in 10,000 this value was obtained by
chance. In the same regression in Table 3b, where "Gender (Institution)" is
regressed against salary, the predictor results in a p-value equaling 0.4754,
making the gender effect as reflected by "Gender (Institution)" of absolutely
no statistical consequence. 96 This means that females receive lower salaries
because they have been law academics for less time, but not because they are
female. Recall that Table 3a shows that gender has a significant relationship
to salary. However, Tables 11 and 3b show that gender has a significant
relationship with salary only because gender also has a significant relationship
with seniority.' Tables 11 and 3b show that women have lower salaries than
men because they have less seniority, not because they are women.
Tables 3c, 3d, and 3e report results of another regression.98 This uses the
decile of the institution from which law faculty received their juris doctor
degrees as the dependent variable. Salary was not included in this regression
or in the results in these tables. The model in Table 3c reveals that there are
statistically significant differences in law school decile at the three law
schools in our study." Specifically, Table 3c reveals that there are statistically
significant associations between decile of the institution from which faculty
received their degree and particular institutions which employ them as
professors in our study. In other words, some schools in this study hire
professors with juris doctor degrees from higher ranked law schools than other
schools in this study. Although Table 3c does not reveal which schools
engage in this practice, Table 3d does. Specifically, there is no statistically
significant difference between the decile of the law schools attended of the
faculty between Schools A and C where the p-value equals 0.5946.I" There
is a statistically significant difference, where the p-value equals 0.0001,
between the faculty at A and B and at C and B."0 ' In short, B hires faculty
from statistically significantly lower decile law schools than either A or C." 2
With respect to gender, Table 3e reveals that in all three law schools in
this study, men faculty were graduated from higher ranked law schools than

3b is: Salary=institution + years of service (institution) + gender (institution). That is, both
years of service and gender are nested within the particular institution. In other words, if two
individuals, one male and one female, each had the same years of service and were at the same
institution, they would have salaries that reflected no statistically significant difference.
96. Id.
97. See Table 3b, infra, and Table 11, supra.
98. Tables 3c, 3d, and 3e are located in the Appendix, infra.
99. See Table 3c, infra.
100. Table 3d, infra.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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women."°3 Referring back to the opening scenario then, Table 3b supports
Dean Hoyle's assertion that women who have the same seniority as men at the
same institution would be making salaries that are statistically no different
than their male counterparts. However, Table 3e is at odds with Hoyle's claim
that women have academic credentials as good if not better than those of men.
There is, however, no statistically significant difference in scholarly
productivity between men and women.' °4
Table 11 refines the gender analysis when gender is added to a model
containing institution, seniority, and solo hit rate, which is used as a measure
of scholarly productivity. In Table 11, when gender is added to the base
model, the p-value of the added variable gender is 0.8197, which means that
gender is not statistically significant and, furthermore, the change in the model
R squared was only 0.0017.15 This result does little to enhance the model's
predictive capacity, as is also the case for having a local degree, being
graduated from a top law school, or having been a law review graduate. Each
of these factors was statistically insignificant.
On the other hand, Table 11 reveals that years of service after removing
"Solo Outside LR Hit Rate" from the model, the R squared of the base model
becomes 0.7659, a drop of only 0.0428 in R squared."° This means that years
of service at a particular school explains almost 77% of the approximately
81% of the variation of salary explained by the base model. Putting it another
way, by itself gender is a statistically significant factor" in determining
salary, but after adjusting for years of service, gender is quite trivial and not
at all significant.'0 8 This supports Dean Hoyle's observation that gender,
when nested at a particular institution's salary regime, which places the vast
portion of salary determination on seniority, is not a significant factor in
affecting salaries.
There is another plausible, but decidedly darker, interpretation to the
gender/seniority data in this study which Professor Jones raises in the
introductory scenario. Men have traditionally predominated law school
faculties and thus have greater seniority than women. Because the Civil
Rights Act of 1964"° and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938"0 both, in
effect, grandfather in senior male faculty via recognizing seniority as a
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See infra Table 3e (p-value = 0.0206).
See Table 3a, supra.
Table 11, supra.
Id.
See Table 3, infra.
See Table 11, supra.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994).
See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994).
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defense to challenges under them, one might argue, as did Professor Jones,
that a reward system heavily weighted to seniority and under-weighting
scholarly merit, legally achieves a type of gender discrimination which would
be illegal if done overtly via gender. The fact that women have a greater
proportion of recent hires than men only adds credence to Professor Jones'
contention. If law schools departed from salary reward schemes weighted
heavily toward seniority to systems giving scholarship greater weight, law
schools would undercut such cynical interpretations of their reward structures.
A more benign, albeit unflattering, interpretation of the use of seniority as a
proxy measure of faculty productivity is administrative indolence. Many
deans do not know about the capability of Lotus, Excel, and other computer
programs to reveal relationships such as scholarly productivity and salary. A
less complementary explanation for over-reliance on seniority as a
productivity proxy may be the reluctance on the part of deans to fight the
political battles to relate scholarly productivity more closely to salary because
their political support within the law school may well stem from senior,
relatively nonproductive faculty. Deans, on the other hand, do understand
seniority and because it is a legally defensible means to discriminate based on
salary, it remains the flawed measure of faculty productivity and salary.
One other statistic undercuts Hoyle's claim that women hired possess
qualifications "equal to or better than men." As noted above, our study in
Table 3e indicates that for the three law schools combined, males attended
more prestigious law schools, as the p-value equals 0.0206, than women, but
there are no statistically significant differences for individual law schools in
this study."' Why law schools hire women with lesser credentials than men
opens the door to unflattering speculation about motives of law school
administrators."' A defensible reason for doing so may reside in the intensity
111. See Table 3e, infra.
112. See generally FEDERALGLASS CEILING COMMISSION, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING
FU.L USE OFTHE NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL 31 (1995).
The Glass Ceiling Commission CEO survey, focus groups and papers
prepared by Woo, Bell, and Nkomo, James et al, Thomas, Wernick,
Woody and Weiss, as well as independent research conducted by

Catalyst, the Hispanic Policy Development Project, White, Morrison and
Rosener, suggest that the glass ceiling exists because of the perception of
many white males that as a group they are losing-losing the corporate
game, losing control, and losing opportunity. Many middle- and upperlevel white male managers view the inclusion of minorities and women
in management as a direct threat to their own chances for advancement.
They fear that they are losing competitive advantage. White male middlelevel corporate managers, who were interviewed in independent studies,
frequently alluded to loss of opportunity.
Id. While the above comments relate to the business world, the ideas of loss of position and
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of market forces for highly qualified, and relatively scarce, women law
professor candidates."1 3
III.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

This study relates salary to several independent variables in an attempt

to see if any of these has a clearer relationship to salary than the other.
Presently, several observations are in order. First, law schools' aspiration
levels should be commensurate with the resources available to faculty to

achieve them. It is imposing unrealistic expectations on faculty who lack
library resources, salaries, have inappropriate teaching loads given a research

mission, and general research facilities to achieve high expectations. Clearly,
School C's salaries are much above those of either A or B's, and scholarly
productivity at C was significantly higher than at A or B across the faculty
using most measures in this study." 4 Thus, resources generally correlate with
scholarly productivity. Even though C had a few unproductive faculty, the
number without any scholarly output for the over one and one-half decades of
this study was far fewer at C than at A or B." 5 Faculty research productivity
control are certainly not confined to the business world and can spill over into academe.
113. See Guinier, supra note 7. The authors state:
As a consequence of these disproportionately low class ranks, women
law students are underrepresented in the Law School's prestigious
positions and extracurricular activities. Over the three years of our study
-from 1990 to 1992-women were underrepresented in the Order of the
Coif; the graduation awards given by the faculty, the Law Review
membership and board, and the moot court competitions and board.
Id. at 27 (footnote omitted). The majority of faculty at all three law schools in this study were
law review members while students in law school. See Table 1, supra. Although the Guinier
study only covers one top decile law school, if the experience of women at The University of
Pennsylvania Law School can be generalized to other law schools, then perhaps there are fewer,
highly qualified, i.e., law review women graduates from which law schools can select faculty,
necessitating resort to lower ranked law schools to find women law review faculty, thus
explaining our finding that women law faculty attend lower decile law schools.
114. Two measures of scholarly productivity in which School C came in third involve
productivity rates: solo law review hit rate at outside law reviews and solo outside page rate at
outside law reviews. Both of these scholarly productivity measures involve publication in law
reviews "outside" the local law school. As noted in Part II, D, supra, School C's faculty tended
to publish more articles "in house" than at either School A or B no doubt because C's law
review is highly ranked compared to that of either A or B. However this fact should give the
faculty and the dean at C pause and cause them to ask if their School's reputation might be
improved if publishing at peer law reviews were more frequent. The answer appears to be "no,"
because review of C's U.S. News and World Report rankings finds C's student selectivity and
student placement, not faculty scholarship, as the principal ratings detractors.
115. About thirty percent of School A's faculty members had not written one or more
law review articles either "inside" or "outside" the local law review since July 1980, the date
of creation of the LegalTrac database. For School B the percentage of faculty without one or
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has been shown to influence a law school's ranking, and, thus, the faculty is
seen as a key determinant in its ranking.
Second, a reward system that uses seniority as a prime determinant of
salary sends a signal to faculty that is counterproductive to encouraging longterm research productivity. Scholarly productivity fell off at all three schools
post-tenure. However, at school C, scholarly productivity was shown to have
a strong, statistically significant relationship to salary post-tenure, while at
school A productivity did affect salaries in at least a moderately statistically
significant way. It would send a stronger signal to faculty to have legal
research track salary more closely than now appears to be the case,
particularly in Schools A and B. If this were done, there is a strong
probability that these law schools, neither of which is a top 20 law school,
could enhance their academic standings and their school's ranking.
Third, law schools should become more transparent in their
administration. They should more openly and specifically articulate standards
for faculty evaluation and advancement. Evaluation systems shrouded in
vague terminology such as "established scholar" do little to improve morale
or productivity. Vague evaluations can have the unintended effect of opening
law school administrators to charges of improper bias."'6 Given the
importance of law faculties in measuring a school's stature, it is ironic that
law schools, which teach due process, do a poor job of providing it to their
faculties.
Fourth, if greater emphasis is placed on measuring faculty research
output at any college, there must simultaneously be statistically based,
objective evaluations of teaching. This phenomenon occurs because research
laggards are not hesitant to pander to teaching evaluation schemes based
solely on numerically-based "student impressions" of good teaching in an
effort to offset low research productivity."' Use of "out-of-the-box," nonstudent, statistically based evaluations of faculty teaching, can blunt faculty
tactics to subvert true measures of teaching prowess. Statistics such as
more "inside" or "outside" law review articles for the period under study was about 12% and
for School C the percentage was 6%.
116. Bell, supra note 5.
117. One can simply glance at the salary data of one law school in this paper to conclude
that law review research productivity is not the sole basis for assigning salaries. Other factors,
such as classroom performance, may impact the salary determination. While many professors
producing the highest number of law review publications outside the local law school's review
are paid the lowest salaries, those who have not produced a page in a law review in sixteen years
continue to receive hefty annual pay increases. This disparity suggests that other factors, such
as a professor's classroom performance, are taken into account in determining compensation
levels. Objective evidence of the existence and impact of such other factors on salary
determinations would be reassuring.
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Spearman-Brown indices, exam difficulty indices, and exam question
discrimination profiles are examples total quality management devices to
monitor teaching.
Such statistical measures depend on objective
examinations, which are not the norm in law schools, although at least half of
the bar exam in most states is now objective. Statistical measures are used
regularly to vet entrance exams such as the LSAT and exit exams such as bar
exams.
Fifth, law schools should appoint deans who are accomplished scholars.
The tone at the top is crucial if an organization is to improve. Academically
accomplished deans can make credible demands on faculty. The dean at
School C was a top graduate of a top law school with a strong record of legal
scholarship, and it is no coincidence that School C led A and B in most
significant measures of legal scholarship. The dean at School A was also a
top graduate of a top law school who had some legal scholarship in the time
period embraced by this study. The dean at School B was a graduate of a top
law school but had no reported law review publications in the years under
study. A dean who has done little or nothing in the scholarly area at least
prior to becoming a dean has a fragile basis for providing leadership on the
research front if that dean has not done some of what he or she demands of his
or her subordinates.
Sixth, to the extent that professorial salaries do not coincide with
research productivity, this fact can serve as a basis for generating internally
funds to reward productive faculty and deny unproductive faculty augmented
remuneration. The idea that a person who has taught contracts for twenty
years has twenty years experience is naive. This person has one year's
experience twenty times (or forty, if the person has taught the course twice per
year) unless that individual can be shown to have developed ideas on their
topic and had them recognized as worthy of public exposure in reputable law
reviews.
CONCLUSION
This study examined faculty salaries at three top quartile law schools at
major state universities. One school in this study paid significantly higher
salaries than the other two, which were not significantly different from one
another. Scholarly productivity was higher by most measures at the highest
paying school than at the other two.
Correlation and regression analyses show high confidence that seniority
is closely related to salaries at all three schools. Rank also correlates highly
with salary. Research productivity by itself is statistically insignificant in
relation to faculty salaries in our base model, which aggregates data from the
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three schools. However, when legal scholarship is combined with seniority,
scholarship does have a small but statistically significant salary impact in our
model. Further, when seniority and scholarly productivity are nested within
each institution, there is small, but statistically significant, financial
recognition of scholarship at two of the three schools in this study.
Gender did appear in this study as a factor affecting salaries because
males do have greater salaries. Males also have higher academic rank and
have greater years of service. However, once institutional salary differences
and years of service are added to the model, a regression with salary as a
dependent variable does not show a statistically significant gender effect at
any of the three schools in this study. A male and a female entering at the
same point in their careers would not be treated statistically differently from
a salary standpoint assuming scholarship and years of service are the same.
Other analyses might possibly refine or provide a differing insight on the
impact of gender on salary. This study did not reveal any statistically
significant gender differences in scholarly productivity, although it did show
that women faculty attend lower ranked law schools.
If law schools wish to maintain and improve their rankings,
they should
give serious thought to modifying and exposing their reward systems so that
legal scholarship, a major component of law school rankings, plays a much
larger part of the compensation scheme than it presently does. Making law
school salary administration more a function of scholarly merit than it
presently is could also assist newly added women professors to realize
rewards for their scholarly productivity, as well as enable productive senior
male scholars to receive significant recognition for scholarship beyond tenure,
which proved true for only one school in this study. Seniority is a weak proxy
for determining scholarly productivity. Use of a more direct measure of legal
productivity would silence cynics who might argue that law school
administrators are accomplishing through a legal route, seniority, what they
are prohibited from doing by overt discrimination as well as those at the other
extreme who might assert that gender or race are used as a proxy for
performance.
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APPENDIX
Table 2
Productivity Measures
Pearson Correlations and Sinificance Levels

Legal
Track
Hits
(LTh)

Legal
Track
Pages
(LTp)

Joint &
Solo
Law
Review
Hits
(JLRh)

Joint &
Solo
Law
Review
Pages
(JLRp)

Solo
Law
Review
Hits
(SLRh)

Solo
Law
Review
Pages
(SLRp)

Jt&S
Outside
LR
. Hits
(JOb)

Jt&S
Outside
LR
Pages
(JOp)

Solo
Outside
LR
Hits
(SOb)

LTh

1.0000
(0.000)

LTp

0.8447
(0.000)

(0.000)

JLRh

0.9119
(0.000)

0.8501
(0.000)

1.0000
(0.000)

JLRp

0.7455
(0.000)

0.9335
(0.000)

0.8623
(0.000)

1.0000
(0.000)

SLRh

0.9075
(0.000)

0.8375
(0.000)

0.9586
(0.000)

0.8289
(0.000)

(0.000)

SLRp

0.7122
(0.000)

0.8916
(0.000)

0.7972
(0.000)

0.9467
(0.000)

0.8426
(0.000)

1.0000
(0.000)

JOh

0.8777
(0.000)

0.8136
(0.000)

0.9726
(0.000)

0.8301
(0.000)

0.9236
(0.000)

0.7669
(0.000)

1.0000
(0.000)

JOp

0.7084
(0.000)

0.8653
(0.000)

0.8232
(0.000)

0.9325
(0.000)

0.7806
(0.000)

0.8819
(0.000)

0.8624
(0.000)

1.0000
(0.000)

SOh

0.8752
(0.000)

0.8035
(0.000)

0.9318
(0.000)

0.7997
(0.00)

0.9716
(0.000)

0.8156
(0.000)

0.9507
(0.000)

0.8203
(0.000)

1.0000
(0.000)

SOP

0.6776
(0.000)

0.8253
(0.000)

0.7604
(0.000)

0.8842
(0.000)

0.8004
(0.000)

0.9333
(0.000)

0.7958
(0.000)

0.9460
(0.000)

0.8434
(0.000)

Solo
Outside
LR
Pages
(SOp)

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000
(0.000)

.704
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Table 3b
The Effects of Years of Service and Gender on Adlusted Salary
Source
Model
Error
Institution
Years(Institution)
Gender(Institution)

R2

df

Mean Square

F Value

Pr > F

0.7713

8
107
2
3
3

9.5961E+09
2.1271E+08
3.6339E+08
1.0315E+10
1.7845E+08

45.11

0.0001

1.71
48.49
0.84

0.1861
0.0001
0.4754

Table 3c
The Association of Institutionand Gender with Decile of Faculty Degrees
Source
Model
Error
Institution
Gender

R'

df

Mean Square

F Value

Pr > F

0.2903

3
105
2
1

17.0325
1.1899
22.2611
6.5752

14.31

0.0001

18.63
5.53

0.0001
0.0206

Table 3d
The Association of Institution and Gender with Decile of Faculty Degrees
Least Squares Means Decile and p-valuesfor Law School(i) Decile = Law School(j) Decile
Law School A
Law School B
Law School C

LSMeans

Law Sch. A

Law Sch. B

1.4008
2.6483
1.2591

0.0001
0.5946

0.0001

Law Sch. C

Table 3e
The Association of Institution and Gender with Decile of Faculty Degrees
Least SquaresMeans Decile and p-values for Gendedi) Decile = Gender(j) Decile
Female
Male

LSMeans

Female

2.0709
1.4678

0.0206

Male
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Table 4
Verimax Rotated FactorAnalysis
Factor I

Factor 2

Factor 3

Factor 4

Factor 5

Legal Track Hits
Legal Track Pages
Joint & Solo Law Review Hits
Joint & Solo Law Review Pages
Solo Law Review Hits
Solo Law Review Pages
Joint & Solo Outside LR Hits
Joint & Solo Outside LR Pages
Solo Outside LR Hits
Solo Outside LR Pages

0.88326
0.90339
0.94258
0.91000
0.94656
0.90478
0.93547
0.89241
0.93965
0.88827

0.03113
0.15508
0.09546
0.22642
0.06119
0.19460
0.13977
0.30127
0.10240
0.26200

0.17545
0.13030*
0.13066
0.06914
0.12961
0.04833
0.08338
-0.00941
0.08333
-0.03012

-0.13508
-0.08727
-0.10033
0.00108
-0.08743
0.03730
-0.09475
0.02177
-0.08367
0.05496

0.01936
-0.06668
-0.00653
-0.06028
-0.01337
-0.04448
0.02778
-0.00846
0.01592
-0.00775

Legal Track Hit Rate
Legal Track Page Rate
Joint & Solo Law Review Hit Rate
t & Solo Law Review Page Rate
Solo Outside LR Hit Rate
Solo Outside LR Page Rate

0.32002
0.17858
0.22648
0.13965
0.22940
0.12949

0.89315
0.96010
0.94964
0.97368
0.92673
0.96646

-0.16560
-0.12398
-0.15691
-0.11067
-0.19188
-0.12882

-0.04016
-0.00404
-0.01497
0.02698
-0.01520
0.03827

0.04162
-0.02651
0.01974
-0.02963
0.04462
-0.00880

Adjusted Salary
Rank
Years

0.34165
0.26031
0.06645

-0.21708
-0.37047
-0.25220

0.74073
0.69981
0.86057

-0.20298
0.16744
0.08076

-0.18561
0.08363
-0.03401

Decile of Univ. of Faculty Degree
Gender

-0.16601
0.08498

-0.04827
-0.10808

0.15846
0.40243

0.86783
-0.56845

0.14547
0.41800

Law Review
Local Graduate

-0.08223
-0.13749

0.12760
0.15162

0.22521
0.10281

-0.01664
0.03296

-0.70923
0.67406

8.89475

5.97992

2.26404

1.22210

1.21343

U

-- =--I-;ned b Factor
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Table 5
The Effects of Years of Service and Solo Outside Law Review PublicationHit Rate on Adjusted Salary
Main Model and Effects
Source
R'
df
Mean Square
F Value
Pr > F
Model
Error
Institution
Years(Institution)
Solo Outside LR Hit Rate(Institution)
Years*Solo Out LR Hit Rate(Institution)

0.8087

11
104
2
3
3
3

7.3170E+09
1.8310E+08
2.0398E+08
5.5427E+09
3.3442E+08
7.1915E+08

39.96

0.0001

1.11
30.27
1.83
3.93

0.3321
0.0001
0.1469
0.0106

Table 6
The Effects of Years of Service and Solo Outside Law Review PublicationHit Rate on Adjusted Salary
ParameterEstimates
Parameter

Estimate

T Value

Pr> ITi

Std Error
of Estimate

Intercept

68027.90

12.10

0.0001

5623.44

Institution
Law School A
Law School B
Law School C

0.00
4985.78
11531.04

na
0.60
1.49

na
0.5509
0.1404

na
8332.92
7762.56

Years(Institution)
Law School A
Law School B
Law School C

1242.76
918.68
2074.10

3.63
4.13
7.78

0.0004
0.0001
0.0001

341.93
222.48
266.54

-7307.46
-4283.55
-19477.41

-0.75
-1.80
-1.30

0.4530
0.0755
0.1967

9701.59
2385.74
14990.68

1970.00
830.90
2753.73

1.80
0.77
2.82

0.0745
0.4432
0.0058

1093.44
1079A0
976.99

Solo Outside LR Hit Rate(Institution)
Law School A
Law School B
Law School C
Years*Solo Outside LR Hit Rate(Institution)
Law School A
Law School B
Law School C

Table 7
The Effects of Years of Service and Solo Outside Law Review PublicationHit Rate on Adjusted Salary
Least SquaresMeans Salariesand p-values for Law Sch(i) Adjusted SalarZ = Law Sch(j) Adjusted Salaoy
Law School A
Law School B
Law School C

LSMeans

Law Sch. A

Law Sch. B

93826.37
90474.64
118365.52

0.4027
0.0001

0.0001

Law Sch. C

1999]
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Tableg
The Effects of Years ofService and Solo Outside Law Review Publication Page Rate on Adjusted Salary
Main Model and Effects
Source
Model
Error
Institution
Years(Institution)
Solo Outside LR Page Rate(Institution)
Years*Solo Out LR Hit Rate(Institution)

R'

df

Mean Square

F Value

Pr> F

0.8006

11
104
2
3
3
3

7.2436E+09
1.9087E+08
3.0757E+08
6.1556E+09
5.0414E+08
7.7772E+08

37.95

0.0001

1.61
32.25
2.64
4.07

0.2045
0.0001
0.0533
0.0088

Table 9
The Effects of Years of Service and Solo Outside Law Review PublicationPage Rate on Adjusted Salary
ParameterEstimates
Parameter

Estimate

T Value

Pr> ITI

Std Error
of Estimate

Intercept

67684.55

11.97

0.0001

5655.86

Institution
Law School A
Law School B
Law School C

0.00
2653.67
13190.76

na
0.33
1.69

na
0.7412
0.0947

na
8012.02
7822.17

Years(Institution)
Law School A
Law School B
Law School C

1249.87
994.30
2105.89

3.64
4.67
7.85

0.0004
0.0001
0.0001

343.03
212.74
268.24

Solo Outside LR Page Rate(Institution)
Law School A
Law School B
Law School C

-487.81
-67.06
-907.16

-1.37
-1.66
-1.82

0.1751
0.0997
0.0722

357.28
40.37
499.36

102.81
25.05
94.31

1.93
1.09
2.71

0.0565
0.2799
0.0079

53.31
23.06
34.84

Years*Solo Out LR Page Rate(Institution)
Law School A
Law School B
Law School C

Table 10
The Effects of Years of Service and Solo Outside Law Review PublicationPageRate on Adjusted Salary
Least SquaresMeans Salariesand p-values for Law Sch(i) Adjusted Salary = Law Schl'j Adjusted Salary
Law School A
Law School B
Law School C

LSMeans

Law Sch. A

Law Sch. B

93931.16
89721.10
115308.80

0.3036
0.0002

0.0001

Law Sch. C

